1. Threat Model: Native NT Allocation vs. fsutil.exe
Disk exhaustion as a defense-impairment primitive splits into two operational implementations that require completely different telemetry layers:
- Variant A — Native NT API (
BigDiskBuster): Disclosed in MSNightmare/BigDiskBuster and analyzed by LevelBlue SpiderLabs. The binary monitors theC:volume for Defender staging paths (ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\...and...\Definition Updates\{GUID}) and holds an open handle onC:\Windows\System32\MRT.exe. The moment an update begins, it allocates a hidden GUID-braced file in%TEMP%sized to all available free space withFILE_DELETE_ON_CLOSE. Defender updates fail withERROR_DISK_FULL, and when the update aborts, the PoC releases its handle and goes back to sleep. - Variant B — Built-in LOLBin (
fsutil.exe file createnew): Documented upstream inLOLBAS #525(yml/OSBinaries/Fsutil.yml). Any unprivilegedUseraccount can invokefsutil.exe file createnew {PATH_ABSOLUTE} {LENGTH_IN_BYTES}to pre-allocate arbitrary dummy files instantly without dropping custom native binaries.
| Telemetry Layer | Catches Native BigDiskBuster? |
Catches fsutil.exe file createnew? |
Artifact / Project |
|---|---|---|---|
Process Creation (EID 1 / EQL) |
No (uses direct NT syscalls, no fsutil child) |
Yes (file + createnew args or PE OriginalFileName) |
Elastic #6946 |
File Creation (Sysmon EID 11) |
Yes (if GUID-braced buster-file created in %TEMP%) |
Partial (only if targeting GUID pattern in %TEMP%) |
SigmaHQ #6310 |
| Kernel Handle Correlation (Same-PID) | Yes (detects dormant/active MRT.exe + volume handles before/during spike) |
Optional (disk-fill symptom via TEMP scan) | BDB-Guardian |
2. Closing the EDR Blind Spot: BDB-Guardian & Win32 Internals
Because Variant A leaves zero fsutil.exe process-creation events and deletes its buster-file via FILE_DELETE_ON_CLOSE as soon as the update aborts, BDB-Guardian approaches the problem from live kernel/userland state—correlating three independent Indicators of Compromise per Process ID:
| # | IoC Signal | Collection Mechanism | False-Positive Profile |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Open handle on C:\Windows\System32\MRT.exe |
Windows Restart Manager (instant, exact) + native name-scan fallback | Very high signal: legitimate processes do not hold persistent locks on MRT.exe. |
| 2 | Open handle on C: volume (\Device\HarddiskVolumeN) |
Parallel native handle scan (NtQuerySystemInformation / DuplicateHandle / NtQueryObject) |
Weak alone (OS services hold volume handles) → OS-service whitelist; capped at MEDIUM alone. |
| 3 | Oversized hidden GUID-braced file in %TEMP% |
User/system %TEMP% directory scan |
Medium (installers occasionally stage GUID fixtures). |
Same-PID Correlation Verdict: When a single non-whitelisted PID simultaneously holds an open handle to MRT.exe and the system volume, the verdict escalates immediately to CRITICAL (near-zero false positives), and presence of the GUID buster-file confirms active BigDiskBuster-like execution. To isolate native Win32/P/Invoke memory from the PowerShell orchestrator, BDBMonitor.ps1 delegates all native calls to a dedicated child worker (Invoke-VolumeScan.ps1 + inline C# in bdb-csharp.ps1).
0xC0000374 Heap Corruption & Named-Pipe Deadlocks
Two real Win32 pitfalls surfaced during live testing of BDB-Guardian—documented in the repo and reproduced in the evidence report:
RmGetListstruct mismatch (0xC0000374): CallingRmGetListwith a buffer sized forRM_UNIQUE_PROCESSinstead ofRM_PROCESS_INFO(~668 bytes/entry) triggers native heap corruption (STATUS_HEAP_CORRUPTION). Switching toRM_PROCESS_INFOwith a proper resize retry loop eliminated allApplication Errorcrashes across consecutive runs.NtQueryObjectpipe hang: Querying object names across arbitrary duplicated handles stalls indefinitely on synchronous named pipes. Filtering out handles whereGetFileType != FILE_TYPE_DISKbefore callingNtQueryObject—backed by per-PID timeouts—eliminated hangs and cut full-system handle scan runtime from ~45 seconds down to 6–14 seconds.
3. Safe Adversary Emulation (Atomic Red Team #3439 — Test #79)
Validating endpoint detections on live infrastructure requires generating authentic fsutil.exe file createnew + hidden GUID file telemetry without actually exhausting the system volume and crashing the OS or EDR spoolers. Atomic Red Team PR #3439 (merged into T1685, published at atomicredteam.io/docs/atomics/T1685) enforces three strict safety invariants:
$targetPath = [System.IO.Path]::GetFullPath("#{file_path}") # default: $env:TEMP\{15755e6b-a54d-4a6e-9773-554c724f8a63}
$tempRoot = [System.IO.Path]::GetFullPath($env:TEMP).TrimEnd('\') + '\'
if (-not $targetPath.StartsWith($tempRoot, [System.StringComparison]::OrdinalIgnoreCase)) {
throw "Refusing to create a test file outside the current user's TEMP directory: $targetPath"
}
& fsutil.exe file createnew $targetPath #{file_size_bytes} # default: 10485760 (10 MB)
[System.IO.File]::SetAttributes($targetPath, ([System.IO.File]::GetAttributes($targetPath) -bor [System.IO.FileAttributes]::Hidden))
# Writes 5-line .atomic-test-owner metadata (path + CreationTimeUtc + LastWriteTimeUtc + Length) for verified cleanup
Using a default 10 MB dummy allocation and recording exact NTFS timestamps + file length in an ownership marker ensures cleanup never deletes unrelated files even if the path is modified externally.
4. Multi-SIEM Detection Rules (SigmaHQ #6310 & Elastic #6946)
Sigma File Event Rule — SigmaHQ/sigma #6310 (Approved, 14/14 CI)
Catching the %TEMP%\{GUID} buster-file stage in Sysmon Event ID 11 (PR #6310) required tuning against real Windows 7/10/11/Server 2022 telemetry via evtx-sigma-checker. During review with maintainer @frack113, baseline runs surfaced legitimate GUID-named temp files from taskhost.exe, TeamViewer (tv_x64.exe/tv_w32.exe), and VS Code's cpptools.exe, which were explicitly filtered without weakening the core path regex:
title: Potential BigDiskBuster-Like Buster-File Creation in TEMP
id: 15755e6b-a54d-4a6e-9773-554c724f8a63
status: experimental
author: DevCop95
date: 2026-09-20
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|re: '\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\\{[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}\}$'
filter_main_generic:
Image:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\taskhost.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\taskhost.exe'
filter_optional_teamviewer:
Image|endswith:
- '\TeamViewer\tv_x64.exe'
- '\TeamViewer\tv_w32.exe'
filter_optional_vscode:
Image|contains: '\.vscode\extensions\'
Image|endswith: '\cpptools.exe'
filter_optional_dataset:
Image|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
Image|contains: '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
Image|endswith: '\target.exe'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
level: medium
Elastic Security EQL Rule — elastic/detection-rules #6946 (Approved ×2)
For the LOLBin variant, elastic/detection-rules #6946 detects fsutil.exe file createnew across Elastic Defend, Microsoft Defender XDR, CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Sysmon, and Windows Security Event Logs, resilient to binary renaming via ?process.pe.original_file_name:
process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
(process.name : "fsutil.exe" or ?process.pe.original_file_name == "fsutil.exe") and
process.args : "file" and process.args : "createnew"
5. Triage & Incident Response Playbook
- Verify Defender operational health: Inspect Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational logs for Event IDs 2000, 2001, and 1151 (signature/platform update failures with
0x80070070/ERROR_DISK_FULL). - Inspect parent process tree & open handles: Trace the parent of
fsutil.exe(or runBDBMonitor.ps1to catch native NT binaries holdingMRT.exe+ volume handles without process-creation artifacts). - Remediate starvation & verify recovery: Terminate the offending parent tree, remove oversized dummy/GUID files in
%TEMP%, confirm free disk space recovery, and force a Defender signature update + full scan for concurrent staging payloads.
6. Verified References
- CUHK ITSC Security Alert — Microsoft Denial-of-Service Vulnerability (BigDiskBuster) (繁體中文 · 简体中文)
- DevCop95/BDB-Guardian & Live Evidence Report
- LOLBAS Project — Official
Fsutil.exeDocumentation (PR #525, Merged) - Red Canary Atomic Red Team — T1685 Test #79 (PR #3439, Merged)
- SigmaHQ/sigma #6310 — Potential BigDiskBuster-Like Buster-File Creation in TEMP (Approved)
- elastic/detection-rules #6946 — Suspicious File Creation with Fsutil (Approved ×2)
- LevelBlue SpiderLabs — Filling the Well: BigDiskBuster and the Defender Update That Never Lands
- MSNightmare/BigDiskBuster (Original Threat Research PoC)